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This study was conducted for the Naval Air Systems Command,
Cost Analysis Division (Air-524), under contract number
N0001985WR5279W, dated 13 February 1985. The objective of the
study is two-fold. The first Is to address the issue of estimating
nonrecurring costs associated with establishing a second source.
The second is to examine the dual award quantity-split issue in
order to minimize the effect of contractor gaming and maximize
financial benefits to the government.
This final report, along with a companion volume, is submitted
in fulfillment of the contractual requirement. The companion
volume is not available for public release.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study addresses two important issues related to establishing
a second source and managing a program under dual source competition.
The first relates to the issue of estimating nonrecurring costs.
The second relates to the issue of dual award quantity-split .in
order to maintain a competitive environment.
In dual sourcing decisions, it is necessary that the nature
and extent of prospective second source's nonrecurring costs be
fully analyzed. Nonrecurring costs are important since they
represent those investment costs which must be incurred before
the second source produces any output
.
This study examines current estimating practices, presents
several models, both parametric and nonparametric , of nonrecurring
costs, and analyzes the key components of nonrecurring costs
experienced by several programs.
Three general observations may be made from our analysis.
First, there was an inconsistent treatment of cost elements as
fixed or variable. This problem is especially crucial with
respect to such items as initial and rate tooling, for example.
This provides great difficulties for future analysis of the dual
sourcing decision. Second, each analysis tends to have its own
unique methods to aggregate costs into the cost elements used
for analysis, thus making it impossible to utilize data compiled
from prior study for analytical purpose. Third, a predominant
methodology in estimating nonrecurring costs was to use an
analogy approach for the second source costs by basing estimates
iii
upon the nonrecurring costs experienced by the first source.
Lacking any other methodology, this is clearly a reasonable
approach. However, note that this constrains the finest level of
disaggregation of the cost elements to that used by the first
source in reporting nonrecurring costs on the initial contract,
and this may not be an ideal or even reasonable cost element
structure.
We conclude that, before a valid estimation model can be
developed, it is imperative that fixed cost components be separated
from variable cost components in the cost element structure. The
lack of a usable database for nonrecurring cost estimation may
also be attributed to the lack of standard cost element structure.
Therefore, if there is to be any progress in modeling these
nonrecurring costs, a reasonably standard cost element structure
must be adopted to ensure compatibility of cost elements across
systems
.
A key issue facing the program manager in charge of a dual
source program is the allocation of annual quantity requirements
among the competing suppliers. The quantity split issue is
crucial for two reasons. First, it affects the amount the
Government pays for its weapon system requirement. Second, it
affects the contractor's bidding strategy in its pursuit of
profit to compensate the investment. Chapter 3 discusses the
relationship of dual source quantity-split method and potential
price gaming strategies. Three ways of price gaming are identified
and actual step-ladder bid data from three major programs are
iv
analyzed to validate the hypothesis.
Five alternative quantity-split models are analyzed. For
comparison purposes, these models are applied to two major
programs. Actual step-ladder quotes for these programs are used
to see what would have happened had these models been used for
award decisions. From the standpoint of cost performance, the
minimum total cost rule and the dual competitive award method
seem to be more effective than the other three. However, only
Pelzer's method and the dual competitive award method made a
modest attempt to cope with the price gamesmanship. Therefore,
we conclude that it is imperative that a new dual award quantity-
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There is a clear preference in government procurement, especially
defense procurement, for competitive awards. This policy is
clearly reflected in current administration policies and Congres-
sional pressure. It is believed that competition places the
government in a more favorable position. However, in order to
introduce competition in major weapons system procurement, a
second source of supply must be created. This study addresses
two important issues related to establishing a second source and
managing a program under dual source competition.
ISSUES IN DUAL SOURCE COMPETITION
Since 1809, the position of the Federal Government has been to
procure, to the greatest possible extent, goods or services on
a competitive basis. This position has been reaffirmed both by the
current Administration and by Congress. However, the recent push
for competitive procurement finds its roots in the pursuit of
financial savings. 1 Three major factors must be considered in
evaluating the desirability of developing a second supply source
and the feasibility of realizing financial savings from weapon
system competition.
Potential Savings from Unit Price Reduction
One of the major reason for using competitive procurement is
the savings potentially available from unit price reduction.
1 Public Law 98-369, effective April 1, 1985.
1
Conventional wisdom suggests that the unit price of products
will drop when price competition is introduced. Therefore, the
effect of introducing competition to a procurement program on





Nonrecurring costs are unavoidable when a contractor is
to be qualified or when a change in configuration is necessary.
The cost to establish a competitive second supply source can
be high and difficult to estimate. The process of analyzing the
implications of the current drive to procure most weapon systems
on a competitive basis is analogous to forecasting the future
cost and benefits derivable from any other investment. The
present value of future savings from price reduction must be
netted out against these front-end nonrecurring costs in determining
whether competitive bidding should be used.
Optimal Quantity Split
The problem of quantity-split is present in every program
that has dual sources. On the one hand, there is the minimum
sustaining quantity to consider. On the other hand, there is
a host of gaming strategies that can be played by both contractors.
Fixing the quantity-split, say at 70/30, would simply open the
door for gaming. Varying the split ratio according to bid prices
reduces the chances for gaming, but an effective method for optimal
quantity management is needed in order to take advantage of the
competitive environment.
STUDY OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH
The economic consequence of weapon system competition has been
the focus of numerous studies in recent years. Much of the
focus, however, has been on the potential reduction in price.
Little attention has beeii directed to the issue of second source
start-up cost and the method of optimal quantity split when two
suppliers are established.
Objectives
The first objective of the study is to explore the methods of
nonrecurring cost estimation when a second source supplier is to
be established.
The second objective is to evaluate alternative methods of
dual award quantity split, examine the gaming strategies utilized
by contractors in bid pricing, and determine the optimal method
for annual quantity allocation between two suppliers.
Approaches
Due to the lack of prior studies, a logical strategy to
address the issue of nonrecurring cost estimation is to examine
current estimating methods utilized by analysts to assess the
appropriateness of each practice and, hopefully, shed some light
on a feasible and systematic way of estimating nonrecurring
costs. Interviews with cost analysts of all three services of
DoD and major contractors were conducted to establish and analyze
different practices.
Since the decision on quantity-split must necessarily depend
on the bid price, understanding contractor's pricing strategy
3
is essential in the quantity-split decisions. Data of annual
step-ladder bids for two major weapon systems were analyzed for
pricing strategies. Five different quantity models used by, or
proposed for, a.i 1 three services were examined and tested with
the step-ladder bids data. The results offer a unique opportunity
for evaluating tne strength and weakness of each model.
Since the bid data used in this study are competition sensitive,
the identity of relevant parties and bid prices were masked in
this report. Actual data are included in Volume II of this
report .
2
2 Not available for public release
CHAPTER 2
ESTIMATING NONRECURRING COSTS
In dual sourcing decisions, it is necessary that the nature
and extent of nonrecurring costs be fully analyzed. Nonrecurring
costs are important since they represent those investment costs
which must be incurred before the second source produces any
output. It should be noted that the only way dual sourcing
will produce overall cost savings is for the present value of the
eventual recurring cost savings to offset the present value of
the nonrecurring investment costs. Hence, good measurement and
models of nonrecurring costs are required in order to determine
whether dual sourcing can save costs.
It cannot be overemphasized that, from the start, acquisition
strategy is an important element in the dual sourcing decision.
Not only can the strategy generate effective plans for dual
sourcing, but different dual sourcing strategies can create large
differences in the nonrecurring costs incurred under dual sourcing.
This chapter will examine current estimation practices,
present several models, both parametric and nonparametric , of
nonrecurring costs, and analyze the key components of nonrecurring
costs experienced by several programs. Conclusions and recommen-
dations concerning nonrecurring costs in dual sourcing will be
presented in Chapter 5.
CURRENT ESTIMATION PRACTICES
In an attempt to learn what methods are actually being
employed to estimate nonrecurring costs of competition, a survey
of various activities involved in such estimation was undertaken.
Procurement activities of all three services, as well as contractor
sources, were queried. Upon examination of the estimation
methodologies and results gained from the survey, the following
points were observed.
There was an inconsistent treatment of cost elements as
fixed or variable. This problem is especially crucial with
respect to such items as initial and rate tooling, for example.
Initial tooling is clearly a nonrecurring cost but rate tooling
is a variable cost; despite the clearness of this observation,
most studies lumped initial with rate tooling and called the
combination a nonrecurring cost. This provides great difficulties
for future analysis of the dual sourcing decision. Because the
second source will not be required to incur all of the production
start-up costs of the first source, the premise of this estimation
exercise requires the ability to discern the nonrecurring from
the recurring costs.
Another observation from the survey is that each study used
a unique method to aggregate costs into the cost elements used
for analysis. In some cases, such obvious costs as project
management were not broken out separately but were lumped into
other categories.
The final observation is that a predominant methodology in
estimating nonrecurring costs was to use an analogy approach for
the second source costs by basing estimates upon the nonrecurring
costs experienced by the first source. Lacking any other methodo-
logy, this is clearly a reasonable approach. However, note that
this constrains the finest level of disaggregation of the cost
elements to that used by the first source in reporting nonrecur-
ring costs on the initial contract, and this may not be an ideal
or even reasonable cost element structure.
MODELS OF NONRECURRING COSTS
Several publicly-available analyses from the survey presented
enough information on their construction to warrant in-depth
examination. These were analyses of the potential effects of
dual source competition on the procurement of the Advanced




A report considering the cost implications of establishing
a second production source and implementing dual source competition
for the AIAAM was prepared by Science Applications, Inc. ( SAI ) .
3
The SAI report was based upon a classified report prepared by
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake . 4 The NWC cost estimates, based
upon an extensive database of current missiles (Phoenix AIM-54A,
Sparrow AIM-7F, Sidewinder AIM-9L, HARM, Harpoon, Condor, SUBROC
,
and Maverick), were modified by SAI. These modifications affected
the learning curve slopes (SAI assumed a more complex learning
effect with a steeper learning rate) and the nonrecurring production
3 M. N. Beltramo and D. W. Jordan, "Analysis of the Cost
Implications of Dual Source Competition for the AIAAM," Division
of Cost Analysis (MAT-01F4), Headquarters, Naval Material
Command, 2 March 1983.
4
"Advanced Intercept Air-to-Air Missile (AIAAM) Life Cycle
Cost Estimates" (U), Naval Weapons Center, China Lake (Code
081), NWC TM 4899, September 1982 (C).
costs ( these were not broken out separately in the NWC report but
were allocated on a sublevel basis in the SAI report).
The SAI report contains several parametric models of procurement
support costs which Include nonrecurring and recurring costs.
The models were fitted to NWC estimates at 6,000, 8,000, and
10,000 units. With Q representing cumulative quantity and costs
measured in FY83$K, the models are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
AIAAM Models of Procurement Support Costs
System Engineering/Project Management
Contractor Total Cost = 41100 Q' 172
172Government Total Cost = 14300 Q
Tooling/Test Equipment
Contractor Total Cost = 1300 Q' 444
158Government Total Cost = 900 Q'
169Test and Evaluation (Government) Total Cost = 11000 Q
Data (Contractor) Total Cost = 10300 Q" 171
Despite the apparent quantitative basis of these parametric
models, an analogy-based allocation method was used at the
subsystem level to generate the models. The SAI report assumed
that the following percentages of the above procurement support
costs were nonrecurring: 33 percent of system engineering/project
management costs, 100 percent of tooling/test equipment costs,
percent of test and evaluation costs, and 75 percent of data
costs. These percentages were then used, with the above models,
to generate estimates of nonrecurring costs. The ramifications of
this approach are unclear, and the ramifications were not investi-
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gated by the SAI report. Notice also that this effort is a
mixing of nonrecurring and recurring costs of dual sourcing.
Therefore, it is also unclear how useful this particular set of
models may be in a dual sourcing situation.
MLRS Analysis
In December 1980 a study was completed which examined the
potential effects of dual sourcing the expendable launch pod
containers for the MLRS
. 5 The study examined alternative procurement
strategies, production rates, total quantities, schedules, and
other considerations on an equal effectiveness, unequal cost basis.
Four major competitive acquisition strategies were evaluated
in the study. The first was a traditional technical data package
(TDP) copy approach which involved obtaining a validated data
package from the developer, solicitation of a potential second
source via educational buys, and a competitive selection for the
remaining program quantity. The second option was a TDP leader/
follower approach in which second source contracting begins
during the first source's development of the data package so that
competition can occur sooner. The third and fourth options were
variations of a "freedom of design" (FOD) or a form-f i t-and-function
approach. Boeing had provided their own design for the MLRS
during the validation phase but had lost the contract to Vought
.
The third option examined the feasibility of Boeing building
rockets of its own design but specified to function with the
Vought launcher. The fourth option involved providing the second
5
"MLRS Second Source Rocket Acquisition Study," System
Planning and Evaluation Division, U. S. Army Missile Command,
December 1980.
source with an unvalidated TDP from Vought and requiring that the
second source's rockets function with the Vought launcher. These
four acquisition strategies were denoted as TDP-traditional
,
TDP-leader/follower, FOD-designated, and FOD-competitive.
In addition to examining the economic issue of costs for
the alternative strategies, the study evaluated program and
contractual issues (schedule impacts, configuration management,
warranties, first source cooperation, and allied coproduction)
and technical and operational issues (availability of second
sources, innovation potential, logistic considerations, risk
assessment, testing requirements, and TDP validation requirements)
.
The structure of additional nonrecurring costs due to dual
sourcing which was used in the MLRS analysis is shown in Table
2.2. This structure was predicated primarily upon the availabil-
ity in this form of data from prior proposals.
Table 2.2
Nonrecurring Cost Elements of MLRS Analysis
Contractor research and development
Contractor systems engineering/project management /PEP
Contractor technical data package validation
Prime support to second source
Government research and development /GFE
Government production qualification test
Initial production facilities
The additional nonrecurring costs for each of the cost elements
in Table 2.2 were estimated using analogy-based techniques. This
methodology was chosen because of the extensive proposals which
10
had been prepared by both Boeing and Vought during the validation
phase of the MLRS program. Also, substantial portions of the
MLRS system were relatively new developments with little valid
historical data to provide a database for parametric modeling.
For most cost elements, the costs incurred by Vought as the first
source were used as a basis for modification in order to generate
estimates of the additional nonrecurring costs of the second
source. For the FOD-designated acquisition strategy, the Boeing
proposal was used as the basis for several of the cost elements.
At all times, the analysis was careful to attempt to establish
confidence intervals on the cost estimates even though they were
generated using analogy-based techniques. Table 2.3 shows the 90
percent confidence bounds on additional nonrecurring costs of
dual sourcing at various production rates for the desired acquisition
strategies. This table indicates the large variation in estimates
of nonrecurring costs with changes in acquisition strategy as
well as production rate.
Table 2.3
MLRS Nonrecurring Cost Estimates
(FY80$M)
Option Production Rate Per Month
2000 3000 4000 6000
TDP-traditional 19-37 21-41 22-45 24-51
TDP-lead/foll 25-48 27-52 28-56 30-62
FOD-designated 74-104 76-105 78-106 80-107
FOD-competitive 86-117 89-124 91-125 93-131
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KEY COMPONENTS OF NONRECURRING COSTS
One of the primary research questions of the current analysis
is to determine if any of the cost elements encountered thus far
are dominant. The studies wiiich provided the most extensive
breakdowns of nonrecurring costs into components were the AIAAM
study and the MLRS study. Table 2.4 shows the percentage breakdowns
of additional nonrecurring costs due to dual sourcing which were
attributable to the components used by those studies. The
percentages shown are averages across different procurement
strategies, production rates, total buys, and other factors
discussed in the studies.
Table 2.4
















* = included in test and evaluation
- = not included
The largest percentage of costs from the AIAAM study were
found in test and evaluation while the largest percentage of
costs from the MLRS study were found in tooling and test equipment.
As the table indicates, the AIAAM study grouped project management
12
costs with test and evaluation costs. Even if MLRS project
management costs were added to test and evaluation costs, tooling
and test equipment would still remain the Jargest component for MLRS.
THE STRUCTURE OF NONRECURRING COSTS
The nonrecurring costs of dual sourcing, in general, include
both development costs as well as production costs. This is
because the structure of nonrecurring costs will depend upon
the acquisition strategy for the particular weapon system under
consideration. As the examples above indicate, very different
cost element structures have been used for collecting nonrecurring
cost data. If there is to be any progress in modeling these
nonrecurring costs, a reasonably standard cost element structure
must be adopted to ensure compatibility of cost elements across
systems
.
An excellent example of a structure for nonrecurring production
costs is provided by the TRITAC cost element structure. This
structure separates these nonrecurring production costs into
those costs accruing to the contractor and those costs accruing
to the government. Second source nonrecurring costs may generally
be comprised of project management, training, production start-
up, data, and test and evaluation/technical support costs.
Government costs are generally comprised of GFE and test and
evaluation costs. The complete TRITAC cost element structure is
included in the Appendix. Further details on that particular
structure may be found there.
Using the TRITAC structure as a basis, a prototyope structure
for nonrecurring cost elements incurred in dual sourcing was
developed. This suggested structure is shown in Table 2.5. This
13
Table 2.5 Structure for Nonrecurring Costs
Government Costs






















Technical transfer and coordination
structure includes any costs which require the use of resources.
As will be discussed below, the use of particular resources may
not require budgetary expenditures, but such uses will always
have costs.
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Government costs will be discussed first. Almost all costs
of dual sourcing currently incurred by the government are absorbed
as overhead costs or indirect costs of supporting the dual
sourcing. As long as each of the different government offices or
locations discussed below is functioning at full capacity prior
to the imposition of the additional costs required to support the
dual sourcing decision, then these additional costs will force
total costs for that government office or location to increase.
On the other hand, if that office has some excess capacity then
perhaps total costs may not increase due to the additional
support required by the dual sourcing decision. If the dual
sourcing requires only additional personnel time in an office not
functioning at full personnel capacity, then total costs incurred
by the government will not increase. If, however, dual sourcing
requires additional travel or printing expenses then costs
incurred by the government will increase. Historically, such
government-incurred costs, even when they have resulted in an
increase in budget requirements for particular offices, have not
been documented as being a direct result of the increased support
required by dual sourcing. In order to fully account for all the
costs of dual sourcing, such documentation is essential.
The organization of the program manager's office is also a
major determinant of how these additional costs may be incurred.
If, for example, the program manager's office uses a matrix
concept where the program manager obtains some supporting resources
from other elements of a larger organization, it will be much
easier for these increased dual-sourcing support costs to be
incurred indirectly via the larger organization. If, however,
15
the program manager's office is functionally organized with all
resources controlled by the program manager, it is more difficult
for the increased dual-sourcing support costs to be incurred in
any indirect fashion.
The first government cost which is incurred is that required
for oecond source selection and qualification. These are costs
associated with the Procurement Contracting Office's efforts to
find and qualify a second source. These costs, although usually
not broken out separately but simply absorbed into government
overhead costs, are surely costs which are attributable to the
government's efforts to provide competition. An example of such
a cost is the additional personnel necessary at the PCO in order
to perform this additional work.
During the qualification process, it is necessary for the
government to test the initial items which are produced by the
potential second source. Usually, such tests are performed by
some government laboratory since this is the primary source of
such in-house expertise. However, such tests may be performed
by a contractor. Again, these are costs which must be incurred,
regardless of the agent performing them. If the government performs
such tests, the costs are usually absorbed into government overhead
costs; however, contractor support and travel costs are not
usually absorbed into overhead. Additionally, the government may
need to validate the technical data package released by the first
source to determine if the second source can produce the system
from the data provided. Finally, it may be necessary for the




Once the second source has been qualified, the government
must set up an Administrative Contracting Office or add to the
resources of an existing ACO in order to administer the contracts
resulting from the establishment of a particular contractor as
the second source. An example of such costs are the costs of
augmenting or creating a Navy/Air Force Plant Representative
Office or a Defense Contracting Administration Service Management
Area office.
The government program manager also experiences additional
costs due to the existence of the second source. To the extent
that such costs are primarily contract administration costs,
they are included in the costs listed immediately above. If,
however, these costs result from technical or engineering problems
such as configuration control of the second source's production
line setup, these costs will be entirely separate from contract
administration. Such costs are usually absorbed within the
office of the government program manager or the command within
which the program manager's office resides.
Finally, the government may be liable for any facilitization
costs incurred by the first source which may become unrecoverable
because of the start-up of the second source. 6 The start-up of the
second source, unless planned for very early in the system life
via the acquisition strategy, may result in a reduction in the
planned production rate for the first source. Historically under
sole sourcing, such costs have been absorbed by the government
6 This contingent liability was noted in R. J. Hampton,
"Price Competition in Weapons Production: A Framework to
Analyze Its Cost-effectiveness," Air University Research Report
No. AU-ARI-84-6, June 1984.
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through an increase in unit costs since such fixed costs have
been spread over a fewer-than-planned number of units. If,
however, the government has included the planned rate in a
contract for purchase of long-lead-time items or in a multi-year
contract, then the first source may have a valid legal position
to recrver such costs from the government whenever the government
starts up a second source. Note that if second sourcing is a
part of the initial acquisition and is planned well, such potential
problems should be minor if existing at all.
The first costs incurred by the potential second source are
those associated with the preparation of the bid and proposal
for the second source contract. These costs are readily identifiable
but are added to the overhead account and so are allocated across
all contracts at that plant. Hence, other government and commercial
contracts at that plant end up with an allocated share of the bid
and proposal costs for the potential second source contract.
After selection of the second source, the contractor can
begin the process of setting up the production capabilities
necessary for the weapon system. This setup must be in accord
with the acquisition strategy which is being used by the program
manager. It may be the case that the program manager has determined
that a form-f it-and-function strategy is appropriate for the
second source. If so then there may be a requirement for additional
research and development expenditures on the part of the second
source. If, however, the program manager is using a "complete"
technical data package strategy for the second source, it is
unlikely that any research and development expenditures will be
required on the part of the second source. This cost element is
18
highly dependent upon the acquisition strategy selected by the
program manager.
The next major cost component is that associated with the
transfer of data from the first source to the second source.
Several elements are important here. Technical manuals and
drawings must be prepared for the production line based upon
information received from the first source or the government.
These may require changes due to the configuration of the production
line of the second source relative to that of the first source.
If so, some engineering modifications of the data will be necessary.
Additionally, there are costs associated with the transfer of
data necessary for the management control of the production line.
It is highly likely that such systems will require rework when
transferred from the first to the second source. These elements
also depend heavily upon the acquisition strategy selected by the
program manager. If the program manager selects an acquisition
strategy which requires little or no data transfer then these
elements may be of little or no importance. If, however, the
acquisition strategy requires transfer of a "complete" or Level 3
technical data package then these elements may be costly.
The next major component of costs are those associated with
the physical start-up of the production line by the second source.
The second source must purchase the initial tooling required for
the production start-up. This should not include any recurring
costs which may be associated with rate tooling. This separation
of initital from rate tooling may be difficult because of both
definitional and timing problems. However, as noted above it is
important that the nonrecurring portions of costs be separated
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from the recurring portions in order to perform the second
sourcing analysis. Additional costs are required for the engineering
necessary to set up the production line tooling and machinery and
to balance the output among the various stations. Finally,
start-up costs may result from the necessity to provide any new
facilities for the production line of the second source.
Test and evaluation costs incurred by the second source
must also be included. These costs can be divided into two
elements. The first element is that of initial test equipment
required by the second source in order to perform the testing
required by the contract. As above, any test equipment depending
on the production rate should be included in recurring costs.
The second element of test and evaluation costs is that representing
any technical support required from other shops within the
contractor's plant in order to carry out the test plan. Depending
upon the contractor's accounting system, such costs may be
absorbed into overhead accounts.
The second source may also be required to provide training
to its personnel in order for them to operate any new production
line equipment or test equipment. Any training costs which are
anticipated to depend upon quantity or rate considerations
should be classified as recurring costs.
Finally, the second source must incur costs associated with
project management of the contract. This includes systems
engineering or PEP costs which are related to support for the
second source's project management team.
The first source may also incur additional costs because of
the second source decision. If the acquisition strategy calls
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for heavy reliance upon the transfer of a technical data package,
the first source may encounter significant additional costs in
preparation of the data package for an external user. Regardless
of the acquisition strategy, the first source may be called upon
to provide expertise to the second source. Such consulting
expertise must be accounted for in the cost structure.
SUMMARY
This chapter reviews current estimation practices, present
several models of nonrecurring costs, and analyze the key components
of nonrecurring costs experienced by several programs. The
dificult task of estimating nonrecurring costs was made even more
difficult by the use of inconsistent methods in cost classification
and aggregation. In Chaoter 5 we will present our conclusions
and recommendations concerning nonrecurring costs in dual sourcing.
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CHAPTER 3
PRICE GAMING UNDER DUAL SOURCE COMPETITION
A key issue facing the program manager in charge of a dual
source program is the allocation of annual quantity requirements
among the competing suppliers. The quantity split issue 'is
crucial for two reasons. First, it affects the amount the
Government pays for its weapon system requirement. Second, it
affects the contractor's bidding strategy in its pursuit of
profit to compensate the investment. This chapter discusses the
relationship of dual source quantity-split method and potential
price gaming strategies. Actual step-ladder bid data from three
major programs will be analyzed to validate the hypothesis.
MINIMUM SUSTAINING RATE
In a dual source competition environment, the low bidder is
typically awarded the major portion of the annual buy, but the
higher bidder is assured award of at least part of the buy. The
portion of the award that is guaranteed represents the minimum
level of production the contractor requires to stay in production
and remain viable. This guarantee, resulting from the desire to
maintain two viable production source, may diminish competitive
pressures and put the government in a disadvantaged position.
Due to the splitting of the production quantity between the
contractors, the Government must forego some of the savings
associated with cumulative production experience. The smaller
production rate also means higher unit cost because neither firm
is able to fully realize the economies of scale. Therefore, the
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split award should result in higher production cost than awarding
the entire year's production buy to the low bidder for the given
year. The argument for using dual source competition, of course,
rests on the assumption that the bid prices should be lower under
competitive environment, compared to sole source acquisition,
thus resulting in net savings to the Government.
MINIMIZATION OF TOTAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT
The dual award method typically involves solicitation of
bids for various portions of the total buy. For example, bids
for 30%, 50%, and 70% of the annual quantity may be requested.
The logical and widely used quantity allocation method involves
computing the total cost to the government for each quantity
combination and selecting the least cost alternative . 7 The
following example illustrates this common practice:
Table 3.1
Minimum Total Cost Rule Example
Contractor X Contractor Y Total




As can be seen from the example, the most economical al ternat ive
is to award 70 units to Contractor X, the low bidder, and 30
units to Contractor Y, the high bidder.
This method would ensure that the government incurs only the
70 $60 $420 $630
50 70 350 650
30 80 240 590 *
7 See J. A. Muller, "Competitive Missile Procurement,
Army Logi stician, Vol. 4, No. 6. (November-December 1972).
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minimum cost possible under a dual award environment. However,
as mentioned earlier, the minimum sustaining rate diminishes
competitive pressures and creates an opportunity for suppliers
to manipulate their bid prices.
PRICING STRATEGIES 'JNDER DUAL AWARD ENVIRONMENT
A major objective of a business firm is to seek highest
return possible for its investment. Therefore, given an oppor-
tunity, a contractor can be expected to utilize pricing strategy
in bidding, either at the expense of the Government or its
competitor, in order to maximize its returns. This section
discusses several possible ways of price gaming.
Front Loading
The award of minimum sustaining quantity to the high bidder
encourages the contractor to inflate its bid price beyond a
reasonable amount for quantities at or near this minimum rate.
A newly developed second source, knowing too well that it is not
in a position to compete with the established original source
for a major portion of the annual buy, may be content with the
minimum sustaining rate and therefore would have the incentive to
submit a competitive bid.
Even for the established original source, the competitive
pressure does not exist is the award of the minimum sustaining
rate is assured.
The use of minimum total cost method for quantity allocation
also encourages the contractor to "front load" the bids. By
raising its bids on the smaller quantities, a contractor can
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increase its chance of getting the larger portion of annual buy.
This can be demonstrated by raising the high bidder's bid for
low quantity from $80 to $95, as shown in Table 3.2. Such pricing
manipulation may result in award of the larger portion of annual
buy to the high cost bidder.
Table 3.2
Front Loading Pricing Example
Contractor X Contractor Y Total
Quantity Bid Total Quantity Bid Total Cost




70 $60 $420 $630
50 70 350 650
30 80 240 590 *
B: With Price Gaming
70 $60 $420 $630 *
50 70 350 650





A contractor may inflate its bid price of the large quantity
if its production capacity is pushed. End loading may also
occur if the contractor believes that there is a lack of price
competition. For example, the original source may inflate its
bid prices of the large quantity knowing full well that the second
source does not have enough production experience to be the low
bidder or that the second source was not facilitized to compete
for that quantities.
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Price Inflation Over the Entire Quantity Range
The per unit production cost of most weapon systems normally
decreases systematically along a learning curve. Therefore, if
the contractor's profit margin is constant, such as in a system
procured under a cost-plus contract, the Government can expect to
follow a reasonably smooth price reduction curve.
However, under the firm-fixed-price contract, the contract
type used in most dual source competitions, the contractors are
not required, nor are they expected, to charge a constant profit
margin. Prior research on contractors' pricing behavior has
shown that profitability of defense business is a function of the
defense industry's economic condition and that the variation
of prices the Government paid for weapon systems can be explained
by the variation in contractors' profit margins. Therefore, we
may expect that, during an economic boom, the contractor's bids may
be consistently above what was expected along the price reduction
curve
.
ANALYSIS OF STEP-LADDER BID PRICES
The three price gaming strategies discussed above may be
illustrated graphically. In a log-log graph such as Figure 3.1,
the long term price reduction curve for a system may be approxi-
mated by a linear function such as line AB . The bid price for
various quantities in a particular year may be approximated by
line CD, assuming the production cost decreases at a constant
rate and the profit margin is -constant from year to year. The
steeper slope for line CD may be explained by the effect of
production rate. Lines AB and CD should intercept at point I,
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which represents the normal production rate used in the determi











Figure 3.1 Price Gaming Strategies Illustrated
Line EF shows what the step-ladder bid price should look
like if all three types of price gaming strategy are used.
Note that line EF is convex and lies above CD. Front loading is
reflected in the line curving up toward E, which lies above C.
Ending loading is reflected in the line curving up toward F
which, again, lies above D. Line EF intercepts line AB at point
J, which lies to the right of point I, indicating bid price
inflation over the entire range of quantity spread.
Empirical Evidence of Price Gaming
To see whether or not the bid price gaming strategies hypo-
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thesized above were used and the extent of their use, the step-
ladder bids of three major systems were analyzed. In order to
avoid disclosing competition sensitive data, the identities of
the programs and contractors are masked and the numbers are
altered. Actual data can be found in Part II of this report.
8
Since there are two suppliers for each program, data from six
contractors are available. Figures 2.2 through 2.7 depict the
step-ladder bid prices submitted by each contractor, along with
the long-term price reduction curves as reflected in actual contract
awards. All numbers are based on constant dollars, using DoD
escalation indices for price level adjustment.
Front loading, reflected by the steep upward bend at the low
end of quantities, can be observed in virtually every case examined,
with the possible exception of Program Y Contractor B (see Figure
3.5) . End loading is also evident in virtually every case examined,
but particularly noticeable in Program X, Contractor B's Year 1
quote (Figure 3.3) and all quotes related to Program Z. As to the
third type of price gaming, i.e., submitting bids which are
higher than the preceding year's bids, the evidence can be found
in Figures 2.3, 2.6, and 2.7.
SUMMARY
This chapter discusses two problems inherent in using dual
source competition as a price reducing tool in major system
acquisition. The award of the minimum sustaining quantity to
the high price bidder and the desire to minimize the total cost
8 Distribution of Volume II is limited to Department of
Defense agencies only.
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to the government in quantity allocation diminish competitive
pressures and give the contractors an opportunity for price
gaming. Three possible ways of price gaming are discussed. An
analysis of the step-ladder bids of three major systems clearly
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ANALYSIS OF DUAL AWARDS QUANTITY-SPLIT MODELS
Given the inherent weakness of using the total minimum cost
rule to allocate annual buy, a number of alternative quantity-
split models were developed and used in various programs. This
chapter examines the methodology and the strength and weakness of
these dual award models.
The performance of these models are examined from two different
angles. First, The step-ladder bid data of two major programs,
designated as Program X and Program Y in this report, are utilized
to see what would have happened had each of these models been used
in allocating annual quantities. The total cost to the government
under each method is then used to judge the cost performance of
each .model . Second, each of these models is examined to see if
it is effective in dealing with the bid price gaming strategies
discussed in the preceding chapter.
The following assumptions are made in order to make all
quantity-split models applicable to both programs:
(1) Each contractor will be able to deliver all quantities
of items it has bid on in a timely manner and in the condition as
specified in the contract. This will hold the bidding contractors
to the terms of the solicitation and contracts issued.
(2) The items produced by each contractor will be assumed
to be identical in performance characteristics and technical
specifications. This places the contractors on an equal basis
concerning the quality of the item and enables us to evaluate the
award model on the basis of price factors.
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(3) The minimum sustaining rate for the programs will be
set at 10& of the total annual buy. This will enable us to see
what would have happened under the most severe quantity-split
condition.
(4) The type of contract that will be issued to the competing
contractors is a f irm-f ixad-price contract unless otherwise
specified.
MINIMUM TOTAL COST RULE
Method
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, using the minimum
total cost rule is relatively straightforward. The first step is
to solicit bids for specified quantities or percentages of
the annual quantity requirements. After bids are received, the
second step is to evaluate the total cost to the government for
each quantity combination. The quantity combination with the
lowest cost to the government is then selected for contract award.
Result
Applying this rule to Programs X and Y, the lowest cost
quantity-split combination for each year can be computed from the
step-ladder quotes of these two programs. The results may be
summarized as shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Quantity-split & Cost Using Minimum Total Cost Rule
Year Split Prices Total Price
Program Y
1 A - ?0* $239,976,420
B - 10* 45,214,591 285,191,011
2 A - 90* 343,333,296
B - 10* 67,496,390 410,829,686
Program Z
1 A - 90* $96,599,682
B - 10* 26,274,360 $122,874,042
2 A - 30* 46,372,747
B - 70* 79,676,290 126,049,037
THE S0LINSKY METHOD
In order to achieve effective competition while preserving
an industrial mobilization base, Solinsky develop a mathematical
model for use by the Army Electronics Command Night Vision
Laboratory during the competitive production of the AN/PVS-5A.9
Method
Solinsky 's method was intended to enhance aggressive bidding
by relating the split in the procurement quantity to the differ-
ence in bid prices between the two suppliers. If the differen-
9 Kenneth S. Solinsky, "A Procurement Strategy for Achie-
ving Effective Competitive Competition While Preserving an
Industrial Mobilization Base," undated report, Army Electronics
R&D Command, Nigh Vision and Electro-Optics Laboratory.
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tial between the two contractors' bids is large, the percentage
share differential is large.
The bid differential, x, is calculated from bids at 50:50
split using the following equation: (assuming A has the low bid
for the midrange quantity)
Contractor B Price - Contractor A Price
x = — . .
—
Contractor B Price + Contractor A Price
The percentage share of quantity for contractor A is calculated
according to an arc-tangent function as shown below:
a(x) tan-1 b (x) c
f(x) = [( ) ( ) + l] / 2
x 90
where a, b, and c are coefficients that can take on various
values, depending on the severity of quantity split desired.
The f(x) function may be portrayed as a four-quadrant diagram.
t(r)
Figure 4.1 Solinsky's Allocation Method
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As shown in Figure 4.1, the ratio of price differential, or x,
is presented along the horizontal axis, while the percent of
quantity awarded to Contractor A, the low bidder, is shown along
the vertical axis. A series of arc-tangent curves, such as
curve 1 and curve 2 in Figure 4.1, can be drawn by the acquisition
manager by varying the values of a, b, and c in f(x). For
example, if the acquisition manager determines that the most
severe split of 90:10 will occur when the price of one of the
contractor is 25% higher than that of the other, a = 1, b = 25,
and c = 1. The equation may be rewritten as follows:
l(x) tan * 25 (x)
f(x) = [( ) ( ) + 1] / 2
x 90
Assuming the bids by the two contractors for 50% of the





Substituting 0.0697957 into the equation,
.0697957 tan" 1 25 (.0697957)
f(x) = [( ) ( ) + 1] / 2
.0697957 x 90
= 0.8343 {% of quantity for Contractor A)
Result
Table 4.2 shows what the allocation of quantity and total
cost to the government would have been had Solinsky's allocation
method been applied to Programs Y and Z.
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Table 4.2
Quantity Split & Cost Using Solinsky Rule
Year Split Prices Total Price
Program Y
1 A - 81.27* $134,215
B - 18.73% 227,209 $301,278,973
2 A - 83.43% 117,950
B - 16.57% 199,560 439,088,330
Program Z
1 A - 61 .04% 28,504
B - 38.96% 36,746 133,143,704
2 A - 56.70% 29,873
B - 43.30% 38,035 140,253,532
THE PELZER METHOD
It has been suggested that price competition may force
contractors to trade off cost and quality, thus leading to
potential reduction in system performance. Pelzer developed an
allocation model to reduce this potential risk by incorporating
quality and other relevant factors into the award formulation . 10
Pelzer argued that the system developer will enjoy consider-
able production experience relative to the second supplier and,
therefore, the latter could not be price competitive. To adjust
for this, Pelzer develops an index weighting system which emphasizes
relative price decreases over three-year period. The method was
10 Jay L. Pelzer, "Proposed Allocation Technique for a Two-
Contractor Procurement," Air Force Institute of Technology, May
1979.
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used in the acquisition of GAU-8 ammunition.
Method
The first step in Pelzer's method is to identify certain
competitive or performance factors of each contractor's product
and assign weights to each factor. These factors may include
performance characteristics, delivery and quality performance,
and technical specifications. These factors are used in compu-
ting the annual competitive index for each contractor as part of
the award formulation. Since it is assumed in this study that
the items produced by both contractors are identical in quality,
these factors will be irrelevant in our comparison of model
performance
.
Bids were requested from each contractor for various percent
of quantity. The bid prices are then fitted to a quadratic
equation to reflect the effect of production rate changes on
unit prices. The average unit price (AUP) for each contract's
bids in a given year is then computed by integrating the equation
over the interval of the percent quantity split range (90% to 10%
in this study) and then dividing by the length of this range
(0.8) .
AUP is then adjusted for other qualitative factors to determine







) (F 2 ) . . . (Fn )
where: CI = Contractor A's Competitive Index
AUP = the average unit price bid for Contractor A
F through F are qualitative factors.
Since it is assumed in this study that the items supplied by both
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contractors are identical in performance, the annual Competitive
Index is the same as the average unit bid price.
The annual Competitive Index is us 3d to calculate an Overall
Competitive Index (OCI). In computing OCI, Pelzer stresses the
contractor's competitive behavior in the two prior years.




t ) <-ol~~> <-5I~>
The ratio of the lower to the higher OCI is used to graphic-
ally determine the quantity split, as shown in Figure 4.2. The
procedure entails drawing a 45 degree diagonal line from the
origin called OS. Along this line all points would represent an
even allocation to each contractor. An arc is then drawn to
represent different possible split ratios other than 50:50. A
line segment, AB
,
perpendicular to the horizontal axis is drawn
in to account for the 10% minimum sustaining rate, or 90% maximum
allocation to the winner. Finally, a line, OS', is drawn from
the origin with a slope equal to the ratio of the lower to the
higher OCI. From point C, where line OS' intercepts the arc, a
line, CD, perpendicular to the horizontal axis is drawn. Reading
off the X-axis, Point D represents the percent quantity allocation
for the low bidder. The award price would be the bid price
corresponding to the quantity allocated.
Result
Table 4.3 shows what the allocation of quantity and total
cost to the government would have been had Pelzer' s allocation
method been applied to Programs Y and Z.
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Figure 4.2 Pelzer's Quantity Allocation Method
^ S
1/o 4 9 16 25 36 49 64 81 100/0
Percent of quantity Allocated to Low OGI bidder
44
Table 4.3
Quantity Split & Cost Using Pelzer's Method
Year Split Prices Total Price
Program Y
1 A - 50% $153,494
B - 50% 168,585 $319,993,032
2 A - 61% 124,032
B - 39% 154,693 454,218,163
Program Z
1 A - 44% 35,077
B - 56% 29,182 133,395,948
2 A - 53% 31, 105
B - 47% 32,909 141,510,480
THE PRO CONCEPT
The PRO (Profit Related to Offers) Concept was developed by
the Navy Strategic Systems Project Office for use during competitive
production of the Trident MK-5 Inertial Measurement Unit and
Electronics Assembly. 11 The model differs from other quantity-
split models in two ways. First, both contractors are awarded
fixed price incentive contracts. Second, contractors' profit
margins vary according to their bid prices. Therefore, this
model is not applicable to the firm-fixed-price contract used in
a typical dual source competition environment.
The basic model of the PRO Concept awards equal quantity to
11 K. V. Fleming, "The PRO Concept: A Method of Conducting
Competition in Dual Source Procurement Situations," February 1980.
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both contractors. However, there were provisions for unequal
quantity solicitations to maintain competition and discourage
price gamesmanship. 12 To illustrate how the quantity allocation
method works, we will assume that the bid prices were contractor
cost figure, and an assumed 15% profit will be added to the
winning bidder's figure.
Method
The first step under the PRO Concept is to solicit bids from
both contractors for specified quantity or % of annual buy. The
sum of each contractor's step-ladder bids for various quantities
is then calculated to determine the low bidder. The contractor
with the low bid sum (LS) will be awarded a profit equal to a
specified % (say 15%) of his cost. The contractor with the high
bid sum (HS) will be awarded a profit on the basis of the ratio
of HS/LS according to a sliding scale such as follows:
HS/LS Ratio Loser's Profit
1.00 - 1.10 .15LS - .4(HS - LS)
1.11 - 1.20 .11LS - .3(HS - 1.1LS)
1.21 - 1.30 .08LS - .24(HS - 1.2LS)
1.31 & over .056LS
Once the prices (cost plus allowed profit) are determined, the
cost to the government for all possible quantity-split combinations
are calculated. The minimum cost rule is used to determine
the lowest cost alternative.
12 Op. cit




Table 4.4 presents what the allocation of quantity and total
cost to the government would have been had the PRO Concept been
applied to Programs Y and Z.
Table 4.4
Quantity Split & Cost Using the PRO Method
Year Split Prices Total Price
Program Y
1 A - 90% $275,972,883
B - 10% 49,236,676 325,209,559
2 A - 90% 394,833,290
B - 10% 77,995,045 473,236,550
Program Z
1 A - 90% 111,089,634
B - 10% 28,412,097 139,501,731
2 A - 30% 53,328,759
B - 70% 92,702,673 145,031,432
THE DUAL COMPETITIVE AWARD METHOD
The Dual Competitive Award Method (DCAM) was developed by the
Air Force's A-10 Program Office during the GAU-8/A ammunition
procurement . 13 The distinguishing feature of this model is the
use of a price reduction curve in bid solicitation.
Method
13 Darrell R. Hoppe , "Dual Award and Competition -- You Can
Have It Both," paper presented at the 1977 Acquisition Research
Symposium.
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In soliciting bids from the competing contractors for the
specified quantities, the DCAM required each contractor to
provide a price reduction curve that reflects the bids submitted.
It is probably more appropriate to associate this curve with the
effect of production rate changes. Terminology aside, this curve
is used to extrapolate the unit prices for the allocated quantity.
Th«i bid prices submitted are averaged to arrive at an average
bid for each contractor. The percent difference between the high
and the low averages is calculated as follows:
High Average - Low Average
% Difference = x 100
Low Average
The maximum quantity split desired is then determined (90:10 for
this study) . The percent difference in bid price averages is
then applied to a matrix for different allocations. Assuming
that the most severe split of 90:10 is to occur when the percent
difference is 81% to 90%, with the allocations changing 5% for
every 10% decrease in bid differential , the following matrix applies
:
% Difference Quan tity for Quantity for
in B:ids Low Bidder High Bidder
- 10 50 50
11 - 20 55 45
21 - 30 60 40
31 - 40 65 35
41 - 50 70 30
51 - 60 75 25
61 - 70 80 20
71 - 80 85 15




Table 4.5 presents the result of quantity allocation and total
cost to the government assuming DCAM were applied to Programs Y
and Z.
Table 4.5
Quantity Split & Cost Using DCAM
Year Split Prices Total Price
Program Y
1 A - 75% $134,086
B - 25% 181,775 $290,130,687
2 A - 80% 116,552
B - 20% 177,074 429,713,299
Program Z
1 A - 90% 24,878
B - 10% 42,016 119,125,891
2 A - 80% 27,262
B - 20% 42,016 126,839,504
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COST PERFORMANCE
This section compares the results obtained from applying
each of models discussed above to Programs Y and Z. To facilitate
comparison, results shown in Tables 4.1 through 4.5 are rearranged
and consolidated, as shown in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6
Comparative Performance of Quantity-Split Models
(in $1,000)
Model % Share for A % Share for B Total Cost
































































It can be seen from Table 4.6 that the Minimum Total Cost
Rule and the Dual Competitive Award Method seem to be the most
effective when both competitors submit bids for the entire
quantity range, such as in Program Z. When one of the competitors
failed to submit bids for the entire quantity range, however, the
DCAM method seems to lose its effectiveness.
It is interesting to note that the total cost to the government
is lowest when the quantity split is severe. In three of the
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four cases shown in Table 4.6, the lowest cost figures are found
when the split ratio is 90:10, while the fourth case shows a
70:30 split.
The Solinsky method and the Pelzer method both result in
higher cost to the government in comparison to the minimum total
cost rule and the DCAM method. Note that the quantity split
ratios under the Solinsky method and Pelzer 's method are much
less severe than the other two models. In order to see why these
results came, it is necessary to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of each model.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH MODEL
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the inherent weakness of
using the minimum total cost rule to allocate annual procurement
quantity led to the development of several alternative quan.tity-
split models. In this section, we will analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of these dual award models and evaluate their effect-
iveness in dealing with the contractor's gamesmanship discussed
in Chapter 3.
The Solinsky Method
The Solinsky method is flexible, in that the mathematical
equation used in quantity allocation can be adjusted by changing
the coefficients of the price difference (x) to determine the
severity of the split desired.
However, the method may be flawed for using the midrange
(50:50 split) bid point as the basis for quantity split. The
contractors stand to gain by using either front-loading or end-
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loading pricing strategy, or both. If one contractor inflates its
midrange bid price, there is a mild penalty. If both contractors
use price gaming, however, the penalty is neutralized. Consequently,
this method may actually lead to increased cost to the government,
as reflected in Table 4.6.
The Pelzer Method
One of the major feature of Pelzer 's method is the integration
of qualitative factors into the quantity allocation formulation.
One may argue that the cost-quality tradeoff function is not
widely applicable and the index weighting system is inevitably
subjective and arbitrary.
One must admit, however, that relating the award quantity to
prior years' prices is a major strength of Pelzer' s method.
Although the method does not have any specific measures to cope
with the three possible price gaming strategies, it recognizes
the problem of unreasonable bid prices and makes a modest attempt
to address the issue.
The major weakness of Pelzer 's method lies in using 50:50
split ratio as the starting point for allocating quantity split,
thus leading to relatively mild splits in most cases and higher
cost to the government. The pressure of price competition does
not exist when the award quantity difference between the high
bidder and low bidder is small.
Pelzer 1 s method also suffers from another major flaw in its
quantity split algorithm. The quantity allocation computation is
based on the low bidder's bids. If the low bidder is penalized




The Dual Competitive Award Method
The advantage of using DCAM comes from its use of the price
reduction curve theory. This method links the bids submitted bv
the contractors to a price reduction curve for each contractor,
in effect making the bids submitted for each quantity level
dependent upon each other. This establishes a production rate
function for each contractor and, to some extent, reduces the
possibility of using front-loading or end-loading the annual bids.
However, the DCAM method does not relate the award quantity
to the slope of the production rate curve nor does it relate the
award to prior years' prices. Therefore, the method is unlikely
to be very effective in coping with price gamesmanship.
SUMMARY
This chapter reviews a number of alternative quantity split
models. The performance of these models are examined from two
different angles. First, the step-ladder quotes of two major
programs are utilized to test what would have happened had each
of these models been used in allocating annual quantities. The
total cost the government under each method are then used to
judge the cost performance of each model. Second, the strengths
and weaknesses of each model are examined to see if it is effective
in dealing with the bid price gaming strategies in Chapter 3.
The results show that, from the standpoint of cost performance,
the minimum total cost rule and the Dual Competitive Award Method
seem to perform better than the others. In coping with price
gamesmanship, however, only the Pelzer method and Dual Competitive




This chapter summarizes the results of our study and offers
general comments about current practices. Suggestions for future
plans to further improve the methods of cost estimating and
quantity allocation are discussed.
ESTIMATING NONRECURRING COSTS
Nonrecurring costs are a relatively small proportion of
total costs. This is shown in Table 5.1 where the only cases in
which nonrecurring costs exceed 10 percent are those in which
substantial amounts of research and development costs are incurred
by the second source.
Table 5.1
Percentage of Costs Which Are Nonrecurring






Sparrow AIM-7F N/A 8
It cannot, however, be concluded that changes in nonrecurring
costs due to the second sourcing decision are small. Table 5.2
shows the percentage increases in dual source nonrecurring costs
over the sole source nonrecurring costs for the same program shown
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in Table 5.1. These data indicate that dual source nonrecurring
costs may increase by more than five times over the estimate of
original sole source nonrecurring costs.
Table 5.2
Percentage Increases in Nonrecurring Costs






Sparrow AIM-7F N/A 162
It is imperative that fixed cost components be separated
from variable cost components in the cost element structure. If
this is not done it unnecessarily complicates the process of
estimating the nonrecurring costs associated with the dual
sourcing decision.
Lastly, it appears that a viable methodology for the current
state of data and models of nonrecurring costs is to use analogy-
based techniques similar to those used in the MLRS report. That
approach estimated confidence bounds on the various cost elements.
With such bounds, it is then possible to use the more reliable
recurring cost models and data to generate estimates of recurring
costs to determine if the recurring cost savings fall outside the
confidence bounds established for the nonrecurring costs. In
this way, a straightforward method may be used to determine the
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extent of cost savings resulting from the dual sourcing decision.
DEALING WITH PRICE GAMING
Price gaming by contractor is widely discussed in acquisition
circles. In this study, we classified the gaming strategies into
three categories: front-loadirg, end-loading, and price inflation
over the entire quantity range. Based on the step-ladder bids
obtained from three major systems, we were able to identify
traces of the three gaming strategies discussed.
We have shown that the minimum total cost rule in wide practice
today is most susceptible to price gaming. Although a number of
quantity-split models were developed as an alternative to the
minimum total cost rule, only Pelzer's method and the Dual
Competitive Award Method made a modest attempt to relate the
award quantity allocation to contractors 1 pricing behavior. From
the standpoint of cost performance, however, only the Dual
Competitive Award Method was able to perform as good as, or
better than, the minimum total cost rule. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that none of the alternative models would
be effective in coping with the three types of gaming strategies
identified in Chapter 3.
The apparent suggestion is that a new model capable of coping
with the three price gaming strategies is needed if the government
is to realize the benefit of dual source competition. Creating a
second supply source involves a substantial amount of front -end
investment cost on the part of the government. However, the
benefit of a competitive procurement environment may not follow
unless an effective quantity-split model is used. We have
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identified the different methods of price gaming that a contractor
may use. It is essential that the new quantity-split model be
capable of addressing this issue and ensure that a true price
competition will exist when the second source is established.
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APPENDIX
TRITAC COST ELEMENT STRUCTURE
100 RESEAIVIH & DEVELOPMENT
110 DEMONSTRATION & VALIDATION
111 CONTRACTOR
111.11 PRIME MISCION EQUIP (PME)
111. 11.1 INTEGRATION AND ASSEMBLY
111.11.2 SENSORS
111.11.3 COMMUNICATIONS




111.11.8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP
111.11.9 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIP
111.11.10 OTHER EQUIP
111.12 STSTEM PROJECT MANAGEMENT















111. 18.3 OTHER PROC
111.18.4 PROC
112 GOVERNMENT
112.11 GOVT FURN EQUIP (GFE)
112.11.1 INTEGRATION AND ASSEMBLY
112.11.2 SENSORS
112.11.3 COMMUNICATIONS




112.11.8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP
112.11.9 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIP
112.11.10 OTHER EQUIP
112.12 PROGRAM MNGMNT
112.12.1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MILITARY
112.12.2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CIVILIAN
112.12.3 PGM MGT CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
112.13 GVRNMNT TEST (DT/OT I)
112.13.1 TEST SITE ACTIVATION
112.13.2 DEVELOP TEST & EVAL ( DT&E
)










112 , 17 OTHER
112, , 17, , 1 RDTE
112, , 17,,2 O&M
112,.17,,3 OTHER PROC
112, . 17,,4 PROC
120 FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT
121 CONTRACTOR
121,,11 PRIME MISSION EQUIP ( PME
)
112,,11 , 1 INTEGRATION AND ASSEMBLY
112,,11 . 2 SENSORS
112, , 11 , 3 COMMUNICATIONS
112,,11. 4 AUTO DATA PROCESSING EQUIP
121 , , 11 .,5 COMPUTER PROGRAMS
121, , 11 . 6 DATA DISPLAYS
121, , 11 , 1 AUXILIARY EQUIP
121.,11.,8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP
121, , 11 , , 10 OTHER EQUIP
121,,12 SYSTEM PROJECT MANAGEMENT
121, , 12, , 1 SYSTEM ENGINEERING
121,,12,,2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT
121, , 13 SYSTEM TEST & EVALUATION
121,,13, 1 MOCKUPS
121 , , 13,,2 TEST & EVALUATION SUPPORT
121, , 13,,2 TEST FACILITIES
121, , 14 TRAINING
121 , , 14.
,
1 EQUIP
121, , 14, 2 SERVICES
121 , , 14,,3 FACILITIES
121 , , 14,,3.1 RDTE
121, , 14,,3.2 MILCON
121 , , 15 DATA
121,,15, , 1 TECH ORDERS & MANUALS
121, , 15, , 2 ENGINEERING DATA
121, , 15,,3 MANAGEMENT DATA
121, , 15,,4 LOG SUPPORT
121.,15. 5 SOFTWARE SUPPORT DATA
121, , 16 INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
121, , 16, 1 RDTE
121, , 16, , 2 MILCON
121,,16. 3 PROC
121, , 17 SOFTWARE CENTER
121 , 17. 1 RDTE
121 , , 17, , 2 MILCON
121 , , 17,,3 PROC
121 , . 18 OTHER
121 , . 18, , 1 RDTE
121 , 18 , , 2 O&M
121 , . 18, , 3 OTHER PROC
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121. 18. 4 PROC
122 GOVERNMENT
122. 11 GOVT FURN EQUIP
122. 11.,1 INTEGRATION AND ASSEMBLY
122. 11 , 2 SENSORS
122. 11. 3 COMMUNICATIONS
122. 11 , 4 AUTO DATA PROCESSING EQUIP
122. 11. 5 COMPUTER PROGRAMS
122. 11 , 6 DATA DISPLAYS
122. 11.,7 AUXILIARY EQUIP
122. 11 . 8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP
122. 11. 9 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIP
122. 11,,10 OTHER EQUIP
122. 12 PROGRAM MNGMNT
122. 12,
,
1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MILITARY
122. 12. 2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CIVILIAN
122. 12. 3 PGM MGT CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
122. 13 GOVERNMENT TEST (DT/OT II)
122. 13,,1 TEST SITE ACTIVATION
122. 13. 2 DEVELOP TEST & EVAL (DT&E)






122, , 14 TRAINING
122.,15 FACILITIES
122,,15, , 1 RDTE
122,,15,,2 MILCON




122, , 17 OTHER
122,,17,,1 RDTE
122, , 17, , 2 O&M
122,,17,,3 OTHER PROC




211, , 11 PRIME MISSION GROUP




211 , 11,,3 COMMUNICATIONS
211, , 11 .4 AUTO DATA PROCESSING EQUIP
211, , 11 ,.5 COMPUTER PROGRAMS
211, , 11 .6 DATA DISPLAYS
211, , 11 .7 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT
211 . 11 .8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP
211 . 11 .9 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIP
211 . 11 . 10 OTHER EQUIP
211 .12 SYSTEM/PROJECT MNGMNT
211 . 12 . 1 SYSTEM ENGINEERING
211 . 12 .2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT
211 . 13 TRAINING













211.15.1 TECH ORDERS & MANUALS
211.15.2 ENGINEERING
211.15.3 MANAGEMENT
211 . 15.4 LOG SUPPORT
211.15.5 SOFTWARE SUPPORT
211.16 INITIAL SPARES & REPAIR PARTS
211.17 SYSTEM TEST & EVAL SUPT
211.18 SOFTWARE CENTER






212.11 GOVT FURN EQUIP
212.11.1 INTEGRATION & ASSEMBLY
212.11.2 SENSORS
212.11.3 COMMUNICATIONS




212.11.8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP









212.13 SYSTEM TEST & EVALUATION
212.13.1 PROD ACCPT TEST & EVAL ( OT&E
)
212.13.1.1 PROC
212. 13. 1 .2 OTHER PROC
212.13.1.3 MILPER




212.14 TEST SITE ACTIVATION












212 . 19. 3 OTHER PROC
2 20 PRODUCTION (RECURRING)
221 CONTRACTOR
221.11 PRIME MISSION EQUIP
221.11.1 INTEGRATION AND ASSEMBLY
221.11.2 SENSORS
221.11.3 COMMUNICATIONS
221.11.4 AUTO DATA PROCESSING EQUIP
2 21.11.5 COMPUTER PROGRAMS
221.11.6 DATA DISPLAYS
221.11.7 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT
2 21.11.8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP




2 21.12.2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT
221.13 INITIAL TRAINING
221.14 DATA DISPOSITORY (PROD)
2 21.15 MAINTENANCE INDUSTRIAL FOLTYS
221.16 ENGINEERING CHANGES
2 21.17 DATA
221.18 INITIAL SPARES/REPAIR PARTS





221 .21 .3 OTHER PROC
22 2 GOVERNMENT
222.11 GOVT FURN EQUIP
222.11.1 INTEGRATION & ASSEMBLY
222.11.2 SENSORS
222.11.3 COMMUNICATIONS
222.11.4 AUTO DATA PROCESSING EQUIP
2 2 2.11.5 COMPUTER PROGRAMS
222.11.6 DATA DISPLAYS
222.11.7 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT
222.11.8 COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP
222.11.9 PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIP
222. 11. 10 OTHER EQUIP
2 2 2.12 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
222.12.1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MILITARY
222.12.2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CIVILIAN
2 2 2.12.3 PGM MNGMNT CONTRACTOR SUPT
222.13 TRANSPORTATION
222.14 OPERATIONAL/SITE ACTIVATION




2 2 2.14.4 O&M






222.17.1 NEW EQUIP TRAIN TEAMS
222.17.1.1 MILPER
22 2.17.1.2 O&M
222.17.2 INITIAL OPER TRAINING
222.18 SYSTEM TEST & EVAL
2 2 2.18.1 PROC
2 2 2.18.2 O&M
222.18.3 MILPER




2 2 2.20.3 OTHER PROC





BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE




311.1.2 CIVILIAN CREW P&A
311.2 INDIRECT PERSONNEL
311.2.1 MILITARY INDIRECT
BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE




311.2.2 CIVILIAN IND P&A
312 MATERIAL CONSUMPTION





















321.1.1 MILITARY MAINT PERS
BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE




321.1.2 CIVILIAN MAINT PERS P&A




321.4 ORG MAINT FACILITIES
322 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE
3 2 2.1 INTER MAINT PERSONNEL
322.1.1 MILITARY MAINT PERS
BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE




322.1.2 CIVILIAN MAINT PERS P&A
322.2 MAINT MATERIAL
322.2.1 DISCARDED SPARES
3 2 2.2.2 REPAIR MATERIAL
322.3 TRANSPORTATION
322.4 INTER MAINT FACILITIES
323 DEPOT REPAIR
323.1 LABOR
3 2 3.2 MATERIAL
323.3 TRANSPORTATION




325 OPER SOFTWARE SUPPORT
325.1 SOFTWARE MAINT PERSONNEL
325.1.1 MILITARY S/W PERS
BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE





325.1.2 CIVILIAN S/W PERS P&A
32 5.2 SOFTWARE CENTER
325.3 CONTRACT S/W MAINTENANCE
326 MAINT SOFTWARE SUPPORT
326.1 SOFTWARE MAINT PERSONNEL
326.1.1 MILITARY S/W PERS
BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE




326.1.2 CIVILIAN S/W PERS P&A
3 2 6.2 SOFTWARE CENTER






BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE





BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
HEALTH CARE
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